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ABSTRACT 
  The impact of agricultural trade liberalization on welfare is a major concern to the 
Government of Morocco.  Several agricultural sectors and sub-sectors that are suffering 
from severe inefficiencies have been protected by the Government mainly through 
prohibitive import tariffs as a mean to support the income of domestic producers. Although 
the rhetoric in Morocco is of trade liberalization, the farm sector, with few exceptions, has 
largely escaped the general tendency. 
  The livestock sector in general and the bovine meat production in particular figure 
among the most protected goods in the country. Bovine meat imports are imposed a 
prohibitive tariff rate of 254 percent. In addition, several technical barriers to trade exist in 
the form of rigid sanitary regulations. 
  It is strategically important for Morocco’s trade partners and those that are 
planning to negotiate different forms of trade agreements to understand the economic 
argument behind Moroccan protectionist policy in agriculture. The bovine meat market in 
Morocco is of high interest to major exporters given the growing size in domestic and 
tourist populations, the high domestic prices, as well as the increase in consumer 
awareness. Given its good sanitary status, Australia is a strong candidate for negotiating an 
agreement that will include bovine meat within a general agricultural package.  
  The objective of this study is to evaluate economic evidence and determine 
whether or not opening up trade of bovine meat will have a net positive impact on welfare. 
Such evidence can become a strong argument in the hands of trade negotiators for major 
exporting nations such as Australia. 
 This study uses data from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), the Ministry of Agriculture of Morocco and Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) 
to construct a partial equilibrium model for the bovine meat market. The model simulates 
different trade policies: closed market, free trade, quota and TRQ. Using the theory of 
comparative advantage and the concepts of consumer and producer surpluses, gains and 
losses are assessed and the net impact on welfare is evaluated. 
 The empirical analysis suggests that total free trade in the bovine meat market 
results in the highest gain in social welfare when compared to protectionism (USD 246.62 
million), followed by the TRQ (USD 206.11 million) and quota policy (USD 4.92 million). 
As hypothesized, the protectionist policy results in large losses in consumers’ surplus. The 
results of the analysis converge with the economic theory and are compelling evidence for 
the benefits brought by openness in the bovine meat trade.
 iv 
 
TABLES OF CONTENT 
 
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................................................................................vi 
LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................viii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................ix 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................x 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................1 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW...........................................................................5 
CHAPTER III: OVERVIEW OF TRADE POLICY, COMPETITIVENESS AND 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND....................................................................................................12 
3.1 Key Facts on Moroccan Agricultural Economy........................................................12 
3.2 Current Trade Policy in the Bovine Meat Sector ......................................................13 
3.3 Overview of Supply, Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage Indicators .....19 
3.3.1 Failing Agricultural Reform Programs.............................................................19 
3.3.2 Domestic Production, Weaknesses and Challenges.........................................20 
3.3.3 Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage Indicators ...............................26 
3.4 Overview of Demand .................................................................................................28 
CHAPTER IV: THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL.......32 
4.1 Comparative Advantage and Gains from Trade........................................................32 
4.2 Welfare Analysis ........................................................................................................36 
4.3 Methodology: The Partial Equilibrium Model and the Notions of Consumer and 
Producer Surplus ..............................................................................................................37 
4.3.1 Partial Equilibrium............................................................................................37 
4.3.2 The Notions of Consumer and Producer Surplus.............................................38 
4.4 Conceptual Model and Policy Simulation .................................................................40 
4.4.1 Protectionist Policy ...........................................................................................41 
4.4.2 Free Trade Policy ..............................................................................................43 
4.4.3 Import Quota Policy..........................................................................................47 
4.4.4 Tariff-Rate Quota Policy (TRQ).......................................................................52 
4.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................60 
CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL MODEL, POLICY SIMULATION AND WELFARE 
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................61 
5.1 Data.............................................................................................................................61 
5.2 Empirical Model Assumptions ..................................................................................66 
 v 
 
5.3 Trade Policy Simulation and Welfare Analysis ........................................................67 
5.3.1 Protectionist Policy ...........................................................................................67 
5.3.2 Free Trade Policy ..............................................................................................71 
5.3.3 Import Quota Policy..........................................................................................75 
5.3.4 Tariff-Rate Quota Policy (TRQ).......................................................................80 
5.4 Model Closure: Policy Analysis Matrix – Simulation Results .................................85 
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis Matrix........................................................................................87 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS ...............................................88 
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................92 
APPENDIX A: Morocco Tariff Schedule – Chapter 2, Edible Animal Meats .............95 
APPENDIX B: Historical Production of Livestock in Morocco (Number of Heads) ..96 
APPENDIX C: All Red Meats Production History in Morocco.....................................97 
APPENDIX D: Historical Cattle Meat Yiled in Selected Countries: Kg/Head(1) .......98 
APPENDIX E: Bovine Meat Production in ROW in Metric Tons (1991-2006)...........99 
APPENDIX F: Bovine Meat Producer Nominal Price in ROW in USD/MT (1991-
2006) .....................................................................................................................................100 
APPENDIX G: Bovine Meat Producer Nominal Price in Morocco in USD/MT (1991-
2006) .....................................................................................................................................101 
 vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3.1 Growth in the Import of Beef Patties in Metric Tons (1996-2006)..............15 
Figure 3.2 Percentage Share of Production between the Main Livestock Categories (in 
Number of Heads) in 2006 ...................................................................................................20 
Figure 3.3 Bovine Meat Production and Cyclical Drought in Morocco (1961-2006)...23 
Figure 3.4 Beef/Feed Price Ratio in Morocco ...................................................................24 
Figure 3.5 Roughage / Concentrate Ratio and Bovine Daily Gains in Morocco ..........24 
Figure 4.1 Morocco PPF and Indifference Curve with No Trade..................................35 
Figure 4.2 Morocco PPF and Indifference Curve with Trade Introduction.................36 
Figure 4.3 Notion of Consumer Surplus ............................................................................39 
Figure 4.4 Notion of Producer Surplus ..............................................................................40 
Figure 4.5 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy (Autarky)................42 
Figure 4.6 Conceptual Consumer and Producer Surplus under a Protectionist Policy43 
Figure 4.7 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy.....................................44 
Figure 4.8 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Producer Surplus ..45 
Figure 4.9 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Consumer Surplus.46 
Figure 4.10 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Net impact on Social 
Welfare...................................................................................................................................47 
Figure 4.11 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy............................48 
Figure 4.12 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Producer 
Surplus ...................................................................................................................................50 
Figure 4.13 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Consumer 
Surplus ...................................................................................................................................51 
Figure 4.14 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Net impact on 
Social Welfare .......................................................................................................................52 
Figure 4.15 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy..........54 
Figure 4.16 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - 
Producer Surplus ..................................................................................................................56 
 vii 
 
Figure 4.17 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - 
Consumer Surplus ................................................................................................................57 
Figure 4.18 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy – 
Government Revenue...........................................................................................................58 
Figure 4.19 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - Net 
impact on Social Welfare .....................................................................................................59 
Figure 5.1 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy.....................................67 
Figure 5.2 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy – Consumer Surplus 68 
Figure 5.3 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy – Producer Surplus..69 
Figure 5.4 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy .......................................71 
Figure 5.5 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Consumer Surplus ..72 
Figure 5.6 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Producer Surplus ....73 
Figure 5.7 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Net Social Welfare...74 
Figure 5.8 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy ................................75 
Figure 5.9 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy – .............................76 
Consumer Surplus ................................................................................................................76 
Figure 5.10 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy – ...........................77 
Producer Surplus ..................................................................................................................77 
Figure 5.11 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy – Net Social 
Welfare...................................................................................................................................79 
Figure 5.12 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy ................................................80 
Figure 5.13 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Consumer Surplus ...........81 
Figure 5.14 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Producer Surplus.............82 
Figure 5.15 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Government Revenue......83 
Figure 5.16 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Net Social Welfare ...........84 
  
 viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 Heads of Livestock in Morocco by Type (1996-2006) .....................................20 
Table 3.2 Production of Red Meat in Morocco by Major Type in MT (1996-2006)....21 
Table 3.3 Bovine Yield in Morocco in Kg/Head (1996-2006) ..........................................22 
Table 3.4 Production Costs of Standard Bovine Meat in Morocco, France, USA and 
the Competitiveness Cost Index..........................................................................................27 
Table 3.5 Nominal and Effective Protection in Bovine Meat in Morocco .....................28 
Table 5.1 Morocco Producer Nominal Price for Bovine Meat in USD per MT (1997-
2006) .......................................................................................................................................63 
Table 5.2 ROW Producer Nominal Price for Bovine Meat in USD per MT (1997-
2006) .......................................................................................................................................63 
Table 5.3 Production of Bovine Meat in Morocco (1997-2006) ......................................64 
Table 5.4 Policy Analysis Matrix – Simulation Results ...................................................85 
Table 5.5 Net Social Welfare Gains in Terms of Agricultural GDP ..............................86 
Table 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis Matrix – The Case of Free Trade Policy........................87 
 
 ix 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
  First of all, I would like to thank my family for their continuous moral support 
throughout the whole length of the Master of Agribusiness (MAB) program, and especially 
my wife Mounia for her support during the preparation of this thesis. 
  I also have to acknowledge the professional support of Meat and Livestock 
Australia (MLA) and more precisely Mr. Ian Ross, Regional Manager for the Middle-East 
and North Africa. In addition to the valuable data, market intelligence and reports, MLA 
brought me the insight to work on the issue of this research. 
  I also want to address my sincere thanks to Lynnette Brummett and Mary Bowen 
from the MAB office for their help and kindness while providing the administrative support 
during my study. 
  It is finally through the valuable guidance and advice of my major professor Dr. 
Andrew Barkley, and my other committee members, Dr. Hikaru Hanawa Peterson and Dr. 
Sean Fox, that I was able to successfully finalize this work. 
 x 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this thesis to my baby daughter Lilia who was born in the midst of my research. 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 Livestock production is the world’s largest user of land, either directly through 
grazing or indirectly through consumption of feed grains (FAO, WAR, 2003). Globally, 
livestock production accounts for some 40 percent of the gross value of agricultural 
production (FAO, WAR, 2003). Livestock production (all categories) in Morocco accounts 
for 25 percent of the agricultural gross domestic product and supports the livelihood of 
about 1.1 million rural families or nearly 15 percent of the total population (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Morocco, Agricultural Census, 1996). The share of bovine within the livestock 
sector varies from year to year and has been ranging between 10 and 15 percent in terms of 
head stocks (Ministry of Agriculture, Department of animal production, Morocco, 2006). 
 Bovine meat production in particular remains as one of the most protected 
agricultural activities in some key areas in the world. Morocco is no stranger to the 
protection of the beef sector as it has promoted a self-sufficiency policy in livestock and 
meat products since the 1960’s while imposing prohibitive ad-valorem tariff rates of 254 
percent on bovine and 304 percent on ovine meat imports (Customs Administration of 
Morocco, 2006). These tariff rates have been constant since the 1960’s and do not represent 
in any case the reality of the current market. 
 As the nation has been moving towards a more liberalized trade, there has been a 
need to assess the different economic impacts of the country’s trade policies undertaken at 
bilateral and multilateral levels. Although the country has committed to several trade 
agreements, agricultural goods have always been given special provisions. Limited 
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exceptions in the form of quotas, TRQs and long term diminishing tariffs have emerged in 
the wake of the new century when Morocco signed an association agreement with the EU 
and an FTA with the US. Both these agreements provide for large quantities of wheat 
quotas and modest to decent quantities of bovine meat among other agricultural goods. 
However, sanitary bans on both origins have prevented the implementation of the quotas.  
Countries that have the required sanitary status can be well poised to access the market if 
they can negotiate a trade agreement. Australia can be a good example. 
 This study will provide nations with interest in the Moroccan bovine market an 
understanding of the current trade policy, and more importantly an evaluation of the gains 
in social welfare resulting from the gradual application of an open market policy (quota, 
TRQ, free trade). Such an evaluation will serve as a strong evidence and argument to future 
negotiators who would seek to convince the Moroccan Government of the worthiness of 
bovine meat liberalization. 
 Chapter Two will explore the relevant literature that relates either directly or 
indirectly to the issue of our research. It will also cover part of the literature that we used in 
support of the hypotheses we developed. 
 Chapter Three will give a general overview of the sector by looking into the current 
trade policy, the different weaknesses in the production chain, the general competitiveness, 
in addition to the changing nature of demand. 
 Many agricultural reforms have been launched (1960s through 1980s), with many 
policies targeted at the bovine sector. However, they all failed at two main levels:  
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• Production efficiency: gains in productivity have been very low from year to year, 
leaving domestic producer price levels very high. Sixty five percent of the farmers 
reach less than one kilogram per day gain in bovine production (Araba, 2005). 
• Sanitary standards and food safety: no major improvements were registered in 
securing safe production of red meats, animal disease control or domestic sanitary 
regulation enforcement. 
 The food safety and eating quality aspects of demand have strongly increased in 
importance worldwide and Morocco is no exception. Consumer awareness of bio-security, 
animal disease and food safety has been stimulated by the well publicized outbreaks of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) as well as 
Avian Flu. The poor sanitary and production standards in Morocco for red meat in general 
and bovine meat in particular combined with the inconsistent and non-standardized quality 
grading, all play a downgrading role in the sector considering the rising consumer 
awareness and the increasing growth in tourist population. 
 Although per capita consumption of bovine meat remains low in Morocco 
compared to developed countries or the rest of the world, total consumption in metric tons 
and growth in the size and income of the population send strong signals to exporting 
nations. In Morocco, consumption is close to 5 kg/capita, compared with 20 kg/capita in 
the EU, 42 kg/capita in the US, 46 kg/capita in Australia, 54 kg/capita in Argentina and 9.5 
kg/capita in the world (FAOSTAT, Food Balance Sheets, 2003). It is important to note that 
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the limitation to Morocco’s per capita consumption is due to the high prices, highly 
imposed tariffs on imports and a total supply that is limited only to domestic production. 
 Chapter Four will discuss the economic theory and concepts behind the gains in 
social welfare caused by trade liberalization and will attempt to demonstrate those gains 
using a partial equilibrium conceptual model and simulate the application of different 
policies. 
 Chapter Five will use data from the FAO, the Ministry of Agriculture of Morocco 
and MLA, to estimate an empirical model and test the hypotheses reached in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Five will also make a monetary comparison between the different trade policies in 
terms of net impact on social welfare. 
 Chapter Six will then address the different implications this study will have on: 
• Possible trade negotiations.  
• The best direction and approach to undertake for an exporting nation wishing to 
negotiate bovine meat market access. 
• Future useful research, additions and considerations.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Reviewing the existing literature indicated a lack of research in the core subject of 
this thesis. In fact, none of the recent literature addressed the issue of welfare gains from 
freeing trade using a partial equilibrium model for the bovine meat market. Some of the 
papers and studies examined the general competitiveness aspect of the red meat industry, 
while others used welfare analysis for other agricultural goods where Morocco does not 
seem to have a comparative advantage such as wheat. Other research evaluated the 
liberalization impact on domestic production, imports and terms of trade and looked at the 
red meat category among other agricultural goods and within a general equilibrium 
framework. 
 A. Ait El Mekki, S. Jaafari and W. Tyner (2006) published a paper on the economic 
competitiveness of the meat sub-sector in Morocco. They concluded that the estimated 
production cost of the standard quality bovine meat in Morocco is higher than in France 
and the USA. The competitiveness-cost index (CCI) is around 135% compared to France 
and 156% compared to the USA. The high CCI is mainly due to high expenses on bull 
calves fattening. Also, the authors estimated the nominal and effective protection 
coefficients (NPC of 1.4 and EPC of 1.5), showing that the producers benefit from the high 
import tariffs protection and take advantage from an implicit subsidy of USD 0.8/kg. 
 Although Morocco has moved a long way into domestic market liberalization as 
well as international trade liberalization; and even though several economic reforms as well 
as structural and sectoral adjustment programs were undertaken since the 1980’s; 
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agricultural goods including livestock products have largely escaped the reforms and the 
free trade trend. Arndt and Tyner (2003) argued in a study about policy and progress in 
Moroccan agriculture, that even when considering the reforms and progress made in 
domestic market liberalization as substantial steps forward, import competing agricultural 
products are still highly protected and no progress was made in linking them with world 
markets compared to fifteen years ago when the agricultural sector reform started. This has 
led the country to have a substantial portion of its agricultural sector not only isolated from 
world markets, but has also led to the existence of several inefficiencies in both production 
and distribution. The livestock commodities can be perfect examples of those strategic 
products that fall into this categorization.  
 Chafai (2004) from the National Association of Red Meat Producers (ANPVR), 
looked at the different constraints existing at the domestic production level. These include: 
• Strong correlation between livestock production and climate conditions, knowing 
that Morocco constantly goes through recurrent cycles of drought, affecting 
pastures and feed availability. 
• Dominance of small farm sizes and inadequate size and condition of feedlot units. 
• Very high land cost. 
• Poor productivity gains: between 0.6 and 1.3 kg/day. 
• Inefficient financing system. 
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• Very little availability of specialized bovine breeds.  
 A. Ait El Mekki and W. Tyner (2004) in their study of The Moroccan-American 
FTA Effects on the Agricultural and Food Sectors in Morocco, used a computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE) to evaluate the changes in variables such as domestic supply, 
imports, terms of trade and welfare. They made a comparison between a free trade scenario 
with the US and with the rest of the world. They concluded that Morocco would gain more 
from multilateral liberalization than from a unilateral FTA. Their results showed an 
increase of 4% in GDP and of USD 2.7 billion in welfare. Interestingly, their model 
included the red meat sector (bovine, ovine and goat). In fact, the policy scenarios they 
used indicated that red meat domestic production would fall by 22% in the case of an FTA 
with the United States and by 44% in multilateral liberalization. Also, the percentage 
change in imports of red meat can be very large (noting however that these large changes 
come from a very low base figure). Under a bilateral FTA, red meat import from the US 
would increase by 4,400%. Imports would rise by 4,529% from the rest of the world under 
a multilateral agreement. 
 M. Ravallion and M. Lokshin (2004) conducted a study at the World Bank’s 
Development Research Group titled, “Gainers and Losers from Trade Reform in 
Morocco.” The authors used Moroccan national survey of living standard in order to 
calculate the short term impacts on welfare brought by diminishing prices of grains (one of 
the country’s main food staples), while simulating different agricultural trade scenarios 
(tariff cuts on imported grains of 10%, 30%, 50% and 100%). The results indicated a net 
gain for rural population who are the main consumers of the traded commodity. 
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 Doukkali (2003) also examined potential gains and losses linked to grains policy 
reform using a GE model. The results suggest that Morocco gains on average in terms of 
national income even though there are large disruptions in the grain sector. 
 Karaky (2002) has used a CGE model while taking into account climate variability 
scenarios. His findings were in line with other studies. He concluded that irrespectively of 
the state of climate and rainfall, the results of a combined wheat and livestock liberalization 
policy leads to a decline in agricultural terms of trade and to a strong growth in imports of 
both wheat and livestock commodities. He added that inter-sectoral linkages under this 
policy will expand to the urban sector by increasing employment. 
 Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1994) constructed a CGE model for 39 sectors 
including red meat. The comparative static model simulated different policies including 
liberalization with both the European Union (EU) and the rest of the world. The model 
resulted in an increase of 1.5 percent of GDP in case of a free trade agreement with the EU 
and 2.5 percent increase if Morocco has free trade with the rest of the world. On the other 
hand, employment in sectors such as grains and meat will diminish due to lower import 
prices from the EU. 
 Stoeckel, Saunders and Monck (2007) co-authored a publication for the Center for 
International Economics, Canberra, Australia, about the gains from freeing trade in 
developing countries. The study gives empirical evidence that openness leads to more 
trade, investment and growth. Modeling provides an estimation of potential benefits of an 
agreement in the Doha Round. Developing countries gain disproportionately from that 
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liberalization. They receive 45 percent of global gains which is above their 20 percent share 
of global trade. Also, 50 percent of these gains come from developing countries removing 
their own trade barriers. 
 Hertel (2006) produced a survey of findings on the poverty impacts of agricultural 
trade liberalization. He concluded that preliminary findings that are based on the currently 
available empirical evidence on the trade-growth linkage suggest that trade liberalization 
can be a very important vehicle for reducing poverty. He also mentioned that households’ 
ability to adjust to the price changes flowing from trade reform would vary considerably 
across countries and that the more responsive a given household is to price changes, the 
greater they will gain from trade openness.  
 The later statement brings us to the question of price elasticity of demand which 
becomes important in determining the degree of responsiveness of consumers to changes in 
price. Moroccan consumers of bovine meat could represent the right category of 
households that would gain from trade openness as they would respond to changes in price 
of bovine meats with higher changes in quantity demanded. Mdafri and Brorsen (1993) 
used an Almost Ideal Demand System model to estimate demand elasticity for beef, 
mutton, poultry and fish in Morocco. Their model resulted in a Hicksian price elasticity of 
demand for beef of -1.633. This elasticity is an evidence for the high degree of 
responsiveness of Moroccan households to changes in the price of beef. We will use this 
finding in developing our empirical model for welfare analysis. 
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 As indicated in Chapter One, sanitary and food safety issues play an important role 
in driving demand for domestic bovine meat and will certainly be a major pillar for driving 
demand for imported bovine meat in a more trade-liberal scenario. That is particularly 
important given the nature of demand in Morocco that encompass more and more tourism 
related consumption which in turn requires higher sanitary standards. A safer and better 
quality meat can increase consumer utility and value perception, in addition to the gains in 
consumer surplus derived from opening up trade. Several studies and publications have 
pointed out the weaknesses of the domestic sanitary and food safety system especially in 
the red meat production sector. 
 Araba (2005) addressed the challenges to the whole red meat production chain from 
a quality and safety perspective. His paper examined the production system in terms of its 
sanitary weaknesses starting from the marketing level to the slaughter and handling level. 
The most compelling evidence of unsafe production comes from the slaughter houses that 
are poorly equipped and maintained and which are run by communal councils with no 
possibility to establish privately run units under existing laws. The paper also noted the 
absence of ante mortem examination in rural slaughter facilities and the non-conformity of 
means of transport and refrigeration systems. 
 Ettabti (2005) conducted a survey of 221 Moroccan households in which they had 
to rate different red meat attributes. The sample rated color first, followed by price, origin 
(within the domestic boundaries and in the absence of imports of red meat cuts), butcher’s 
experience, cut, fat content, marbling and certification. According to Ettabti, the fact that 
very little information is available to customers regarding quality and also that no product 
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differentiation exist in the market (no brands, grading or certification), makes it very 
difficult to rate the importance of some attributes. Color remains the basic mean for 
determining quality and safety in the eyes of the consumer, which is why it is rated first, 
while price remains a highly important driver. 
 The Magellan project on global beef liberalization was commissioned in 2003 by 
the Five Nations Beef Group (Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and the United 
States). These are major players in world beef trade and have a large stake in efforts to 
reduce support and trade barriers affecting the international beef market. The project was 
coordinated by Meat and Livestock Australia while the reports were prepared by the Centre 
for International Economics. The three phase reports produced through the project 
quantified the benefits of liberalizing world beef trade. The reports have also made an 
important note regarding the two-sided effect of consumer awareness and food safety. 
According to the reports, the risk from the new awareness of agricultural trade policy is that 
it comes from the perspective of food safety and not from the unnecessary high costs of the 
protection policies. The reports label this strategy as the “negative way” since it uses the 
fear of food safety and suspicion of imports to continue to justify import protection. This 
can be applicable to Morocco as the country imposes high tariffs on imports in addition to 
high technical barriers to trade. Sanitary rules on imported red meat in Morocco are 
surprisingly very rigid and strict. More surprising is the contradiction with the poor 
domestic sanitary standards. This is important in considering which export origins are to be 
accounted for in terms of import supply in Morocco under different trade openness 
scenarios. 
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CHAPTER III: OVERVIEW OF TRADE POLICY, COMPETITIVENESS AND 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
3.1 Key Facts on Moroccan Agricultural Economy  
  Moroccan agriculture accounts for about 15 percent (average 2000-2006) of the 
total value added to the Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators Database, 2007). This percentage varies from year to year and depends on the 
severity of recurrent droughts.  
  According to the World Bank Development Indicators Database, in 2006, 
Moroccan GDP was at USD 65.4 billion in which agriculture accounted for USD 10.26 
billion. The same database shows that in 2004, agriculture accounted for USD 6.2 billion 
and for only USD 5.5 billion in 2000. GDP’s growth in Morocco is highly affected by 
agricultural output which in turn depends on weather. For example, GDP growth rate was 
at 1.8 percent in year 2000 following a drought season, and was at 8.0 percent in year 2006 
following a bumper crop (World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2007).  
  Livestock production (all categories) constitutes 30 percent of the agricultural 
value added (Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Animal Production, 2007). It is worth 
noting that the above mentioned value added includes all products and by-products of 
livestock raising (skin, leather, wool, etc. in addition to meat and offal products). Cattle 
(bovine) production represents only 11 percent of the total livestock production (FAO, 
ProdSTAT, 2006). On the other hand, bovine meat accounts for 45 percent of total red 
meat output and has been stagnant for more than 20 years (Chafai, ANPVR, 2004). In 
2006, the producer revenue generated by the bovine meat sector was around USD 800 
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million (FAO, ProdSTAT and PriceSTAT, 2006). If we put this in terms of agricultural 
value added share of GDP in 2006, which stood at USD 10.26 billion, bovine meat 
producer revenue would represent nearly 8 percent of that value. 
3.2 Current Trade Policy in the Bovine Meat Sector 
  Since the 1960’s, Morocco has been following a protectionist policy in the red 
meat sector. The policy consisted of encouraging the growth in animal head stocks and 
maintaining prohibitive import tariff rates. Many farm reforms and programs have been 
planned, targeting the livestock industry, but have led to very poor results. These failing 
reform plans have negatively impacted the efficiency of the entire sector as we will address 
in Section 3.3 on supply and competitiveness. This inefficiency within the whole bovine 
meat production chain has made it difficult for the Government to liberalize the sector’s 
trade since it finds in it the same recurrent excuse of having to upgrade and reform the 
sector as a mean to make it ready for international competition. 
  While current rhetoric in Morocco supports the liberalization approach, 
protectionists still have the upper hand in strategic agricultural commodities. When 
agricultural market liberalization is discussed, different voices get intertwined. On one 
hand, reform supporters are mainly Moroccan economists, agricultural economists and the 
World Bank. On the other hand, those against liberalization are mostly within the private 
farming sector and the Government. Those in the Government who would lose power from 
greater liberalization also argue against such a reform. A good example is the Direction of 
Animal Production and the various departments relating to it within the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
 14 
 
  Appendix A lists the tariff schedule on chilled and frozen bovine meat, in 
carcasses, semi-carcasses, cuts, etc. (Customs Administration of Morocco, 2006). All 
bovine meat types are imposed a tariff rate of 254 percent making it impossible to import 
any of those meat products competitively. 
  There are few exceptions that escape the prohibitive rate, but quantities imported 
under these exceptions are minimal and sometimes irrelevant compared to the total 
consumption of the aggregated bovine meat types.  Our study will not account for these 
exceptions simply because the quantities imported are either small, are not officially 
registered with the customs or they do not represent the bovine meat categories of interest 
in our study. These exceptions are: 
• Beef burger patties weighing between 45 and 150 grams with 17.5% to 21% fat 
content and polyethylene packed (Customs Administration of Morocco, 2006). The 
reason why this very specific category of processed bovine meat is imposed a low 
tariff of 17.5 percent (compared to 254) is due to the convincing power of 
multinational fast food chains in general and that of US based McDonalds in 
particular. When the fast food giant was preparing to launch its franchise spree in 
Morocco, it had to convince the Government of lowering the duties for the beef 
patties types used in its restaurants. Cost management and food safety were the 
main concern for the multinational. Investment and employment gains seemed like 
a convincing argument in the eyes of the Government. The change in tariffs has 
also stimulated food importers to bring in frozen beef patties (with the exact same 
specifications as McDonalds) for supermarket and restaurant chains distribution. 
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Low cost producing countries such as Argentina have been able to dominate this 
particular market. Figure 3.1 shows the growth in imports of McDonalds style beef 
patties. Our study will not account for this category of processed bovine meat since 
the size of imports (800 metric tons, Customs Administration of Morocco, 2006) is 
minimal compared to the total consumption of 150,000 metric tons (FAOStat, 
ConsStat). Also, we will focus mainly on carcasses and meat cuts. 
Figure 3.1 Growth in the Import of Beef Patties in Metric Tons (1996-2006) 
 
• The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces through the Supply Commission of the 
Southern Provinces makes direct import purchases for the military stationed in the 
southern Sahara provinces. These imports of frozen full carcass bovine and ovine 
takes place through yearly tenders. The tenders are managed by the Office of 
Exportation and Commercialization (OCE). On average, imports of red meat for the 
military can reach 6,000 metric tons per year, shared equally between ovine and 
bovine meat. Usual import origins are Argentina and Australia (OCE, 2007). Given 
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that the military institution is exonerated from all taxes and duties and is not 
representative of civilian/market consumption, their purchases are neither 
accounted for in the customs database nor in balance of trade. For this reason, we 
will exclude these imports from our study. 
• The last exception concerns the temporary admission imports. Temporary 
admission status grants the importer a certain period of time during which the 
product needs to be processed before being exported. Once exported, the original 
buyer will cease to be responsible for any tariff payments. Market intelligence 
provided for MLA in Morocco suggests that air catering uses the temporary 
admission procedure to import red meat from Australia, prepare it for consumption 
and deliver it to airlines in duty-free zone where they fly out from Moroccan 
territory. No tariff duties are paid under this transaction since the meat is processed 
and exit the Moroccan border (Copralim, 2007). However, air catering is a new 
business for Moroccan companies servicing the international airports and such 
imports of red meat are sporadic and it is very difficult at this stage to estimate their 
growth in the future. 
  If we exclude the above elements from our study, we will be left with a virtually 
closed market in the face of imports. 
   Even if the resistance to liberalization is dominant, the different FTAs and 
preferential trade agreements that Morocco negotiated in the past ten years with different 
nations and economic blocs, resulted in some sort of agricultural provisions, allowing for 
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certain trade flexibility in agricultural and food products such as long term tariff 
elimination, TRQs and quotas.   
  In the case of bovine meat, Morocco granted modest import quotas and TRQs to 
the EU and the US respectively: 
• European Union: An annual import quota of 4,000 tons is envisaged in the 
provisions of the association agreement between Morocco and the EU with a 
reduction of 82.3% on the basic tariffs. This import quota has been practically 
ineffective due the sanitary ban imposed on most EU origin bovine during the BSE 
outbreak and also to the non-competitive nature of EU producers (Ministry of 
Agriculture of Morocco, 2007). 
• United States: The Agreement includes two preferential TRQs, one for high quality 
beef and a second for standard quality beef. Before giving more details about each, 
it is essential to note that since the signature of the FTA in 2004, none of the TRQs 
have been implemented because the sanitary side of the agreement has not been 
finalized on the Moroccan side. Morocco sanitary barriers on US beef are 
supposedly due to the non compliance with standards on hormones, antibiotics and 
other residues (Ministry of Agriculture of Morocco, 2007). In addition, Morocco 
did not accept the rule-of-origin conditions as set by the US and providing for the 
inclusion of US produced red meat but from cattle origination from other countries 
(such as Mexico). 
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o High Quality Beef: High quality beef is defined by tariff line and other 
common US industry standards such as grading (prime or choice). It is 
also referred to as the Hilton beef. The initial in-quota quantity for the 
TRQ on high quality beef was set at 4,000 metric tons, and will expand by 
four percent annually. According to the terms of the agreement, the 
quantity should be standing now at above 4,500 metric tons. The in-quota 
tariff of 34 percent will be subsequently phased out in equal annual 
increments by year five. The over-quota tariffs will be eliminated in 18 
years in equal annual installments. Imports of this US beef will primarily 
target hotels and restaurants (USTR, 2004). 
o Standard Quality Beef: The initial in-quota quantity for the TRQ on 
standard quality beef will be 2,000 metric tons, and will expand by two 
percent annually after five years. The in-quota tariffs will be eliminated in 
equal annual installments over ten years. Over-quota tariffs will remain in 
place unless Morocco negotiates a reduction with another trading partner, 
which the United States would receive under the preference clause (USTR, 
2004). 
o If there was no sanitary restriction on US origin, the main dynamics will 
come from the high quality beef TRQs. These will result on the long term in 
a gradual increase of annual import, 0 percent in-quota tariff and very low 
above-quota tariff (USTR, 2004). 
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  Currently, and given the elements discussed in this section, we can conclude that 
Morocco is in a state of autarky as far as the bovine meat sector is concerned. This situation 
is mainly due to the extremely high import tariffs, in addition to sanitary regulations on 
hormones, antibiotics and residuals. The sanitary regulations can be considered in some 
instances as technical barriers to trade because some are non-scientifically based. 
3.3 Overview of Supply, Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage Indicators 
3.3.1 Failing Agricultural Reform Programs 
  As indicated previously, the Government of Morocco has been developing several 
reform plans with the objective to increase the efficiency and productivity of the livestock 
sector. Unfortunately, all the reform policies have failed in reaching the main objectives: 
higher productivity and safer production. A higher productivity would have resulted in 
more quantities available for consumption and lower prices. Safer production is becoming 
essential as consumer awareness is rising and a larger part of the consumption is 
represented by the tourism sector (hotel chains, restaurants, etc.). Recurrent food related 
illness and intoxication incidents in Moroccan restaurants and group catering have been 
blamed on the very poor control and inspection system along the food production chain. 
  The reasons behind the failure of the Government reform programs lie within poor 
planning, mismanagement, and limited resources available for implementing the plans. 
Whether it is a breed amelioration plan, farmers’ education or financial support in 
modernizing feedlots, the different Governments have failed in assigning both capital 
resources and competent human resources to seriously implement the different programs. 
The general aspects of the domestic production are not making it easy for a reform plan to 
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be generalized and effective, leading to a causality circle. Complex aspects of inefficiency 
in the sector complicate the implementation of the reforms, while ineffective reforms 
sustain the inefficiency. The following section will address those aspects. 
3.3.2 Domestic Production, Weaknesses and Challenges 
  Morocco produces three main categories of livestock: ovine (sheep: mutton and 
lamb), bovine (cattle: bull and cow) and caprine (goat). Figure 3.2 shows the percentage 
share of each category, and Table 3.1 shows the share in terms of head stocks. 
Figure 3.2 Percentage Share of Production between the Main Livestock Categories (in 
Number of Heads) in 2006 
11%
68%
21%
Ovine
Caprine Bovine
Source: FAOSTAT - ProdSTAT
 
 
Table 3.1 Heads of Livestock in Morocco by Type (1996-2006) 
Year Stocks of Bovine Stocks of Ovine Stocks of Caprine 
1996          2 408 400           14 536 100               4 594 700    
1997          2 547 200           15 286 700               4 789 900    
1998          2 568 600           14 783 900               4 959 200    
1999          2 565 500           16 576 400               4 704 400    
2000          2 674 600           17 299 700               4 930 700    
2001          2 647 100           17 172 300               5 133 300    
2002          2 669 600           16 335 500               5 090 400    
2003          2 688 600           16 743 000               5 208 300    
2004          2 728 800           17 026 300               5 358 600    
2005          2 721 700           16 872 000               5 331 600    
2006          2 721 700           16 872 000               5 331 600    
Source: FAOSTAT – ProdSTAT 
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  Appendix B gives a longer historical data on stock production (FAOSTAT, 
ProdSTAT). It is easy to notice that as far as stocks are concerned, ovine exceeds bovine by 
far. On the hand, bovine meat production in metric tons is larger than ovine meat 
production due to the difference in animal weight. Table 3.2 shows the red meat production 
in Morocco by major type. 
Table 3.2 Production of Red Meat in Morocco by Major Type in MT (1996-2006) 
Year Bovine Meat Ovine Meat Caprine Meat Total Red Meat 
1996         103 000             90 000            22 000             216 996    
1997         125 000           120 000            22 000             268 997    
1998         120 000           115 000            22 000             258 998    
1999         135 000           126 000            20 000             282 999    
2000         140 000           125 000            22 000             289 000    
2001         145 000           125 000            20 500             292 501    
2002         170 000           110 000            15 000             297 002    
2003         150 000           105 000            13 000             270 003    
2004         140 000           105 000            18 000             265 004    
2005         150 400           108 000            16 000             276 405    
2006         150 000           112 000            17 000             281 006    
Source: FAOSTAT - ProdSTAT    
Figures based on Dressed Carcass Weight: Excluding Offal and Slaughter Fats.  
Bovine includes Veal and Ovine includes Lamb.   
   
  Appendix C contains a longer term history of red meat production across more 
animal categories (FAOSTAT, ProdSTAT). 
  The Ministry of Agriculture through the General Agricultural Census, estimates 
that there are 1.1 million families (about 15 percent of the total population) relying on 
livestock as their source of income. The same census estimates that 74 percent of all 
farmers practise some form of livestock raising (all types).  In fact, domestic producers use 
livestock as a security and risk diversion activity in case of crop failure. This means that 
specialization in livestock production is uncommon if not rare. 
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  Domestic production of bovine suffers from both structural and cyclical 
weaknesses and inefficiencies. These have been reported by the ANPVR, which is the 
National Association of Red Meat Producers as well as several agricultural economists like 
Abdelilah Araba from the Hassan II Institute of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine. Both 
sources have published studies about the challenges facing national bovine production. 
• The bovine sector did not receive the necessary support from the Government to 
enable it to become efficient. The lack of high added value and specialized breeds 
(similar to Santa Gertrudis or Angus) and the high costs of feed inputs have 
contributed to the low carcass weight (194 kg per head). This poor yield has led to 
the low levels of consumption which are below the nutritional standards. For 
instance, the yield in the US is of 351 kg per head and 247 kg per head in Australia. 
Table 3.3 shows the poor improvement in productivity in terms of carcass weight 
(FAOSTAT, ProdSTAT). Appendix D includes a longer history of cattle meat yield 
in Morocco, Australia, France and the US (FAOSTAT, ProdSTAT). 
Table 3.3 Bovine Yield in Morocco in Kg/Head (1996-2006) 
Year Yield in Kg/head * 
1996 160 
1997 176 
1998 178 
1999 192 
2000 175 
2001 180 
2002 178 
2003 185 
2004 194 
2005 194 
2006 194 
Source: FAOSTAT, ProdSTAT 
* Based on Full Carcass Weight. 
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• Moroccan agriculture is subject to recurrent cycles of drought. These have also had 
a major impact on bovine production and yield fluctuations, and have affected 
prices significantly. A dry year also implies lower feed grains production and low 
pasture yield which increase total costs. Figure 3.3 illustrates the change in bovine 
meat production due to the climatic conditions. In 1975, the total bovine stock was 
at 3.6 million heads and dropped by 30% during the 1980s drought, then due to 
tough climatic conditions in 1992, 1993 and 1995, bovine stocks went down to 2.4 
million (Chafai, ANPVR, 2004). 
Figure 3.3 Bovine Meat Production and Cyclical Drought in Morocco (1961-2006) 
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• The big impact the drought cycles have on pastures has pushed some farmers to 
abandon extensive ranching and seek fattening and feedlot activities, while ignoring 
the large constraints and challenges faced by this activity given the absence of high 
quality breeds, high feed-grains cost and lack of technical knowledge pertaining to 
fattening and commercialization. Figure 3.4 shows a Beef/Feed price ratio, while 
Figure 3.5 shows roughage concentrate ratio and animal daily gains. 
Figure 3.4 Beef/Feed Price Ratio in Morocco 
 
Figure 3.5 Roughage / Concentrate Ratio and Bovine Daily Gains in Morocco 
      
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
Source: Araba (2005) 
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Source: Araba (2005) 
- ADG: Average Daily Gain in Kg per day 
- ADGimp: Average Daily Gain using  
imported breeds 
- ADGnat: Average Daily Gain using  
national breeds 
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• Increasing the total population in the bovine sector remains very difficult due to the 
currently high animal density. In addition, price of land is very high. An increase in 
total meat production could only come from an increase in productivity. 
•  In Morocco, the bovine sector is known for the very small size of its operations, 
which add to the general inefficiency. In 1996, the year during which the last 
Agricultural Census was conducted, out of the 1.1 million farm units that practice 
livestock production, 768,000 units owned a total of 2.4 million heads of bovine. 
The very large number of units led to a very low average ownership per farm of less 
than 2 animals (Chafai, ANPVR, 2004). This factor has also resulted in small and 
non-dynamic professional organizations.  
• In the commercialization side, there is existence of great speculation animated by 
multiple intermediaries. Sale of cattle is often quoted in piece-rate instead of 
weight. 95% of the transactions are done within the “souks” which are poorly 
organized rural markets. 
• Finally, the sanitary side suffers from extreme weaknesses: 
o No traceability systems are in place to contain animal disease. Actually, no 
effective systems have been put in place to permanently control for animal 
disease outbreaks or control for meat contamination. 
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o Poor control at the animal marketing and commercialization levels and 
absence of cleaning between the market point of sale and the slaughter 
houses. In addition, there is absence of grading based on animal breed or 
meat quality. 
o There are 182 city-owned slaughter houses in Morocco and 724 in rural 
areas. According to the Ministry of Agriculture figures, only 45 percent of 
the total red meat produced in the country is controlled by the veterinary 
and sanitary service. In major cities like Casablanca, 70 percent of red meat 
is supplied through clandestine slaughtering and escape all forms of 
veterinary or sanitary regulations. On the other hand, the existing official 
slaughter houses are in very poor condition affecting tremendously meat 
quality and safety: absence or bad state of plumbing, lack of cold rooms, 
absence of post-mortem examination in rural slaughters, no separation 
between clean and soiled areas. By law, only municipalities have the right 
to own slaughter houses which means that private initiative is discarded. 
The food safety issue goes all the way down distribution chain: Non 
conformity of means of transport and storage (carcasses are seldom kept 
refrigerated in butcher shops). 
3.3.3 Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage Indicators 
  It is important to measure the degree of inefficiency in the bovine sector within the 
context of international competitiveness. Ait El Mekki, Jaafari and Tyner (2006) have 
conducted an interesting study on economic competitiveness of the meat sub-sector in 
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Morocco.  The results of interest to us include the competitiveness cost index (CCI) and the 
protection and comparative advantage indicators (nominal protection and effective 
protection). 
  Table 3.4 shows production costs of standard bovine meat in Morocco compared 
to France and the USA and shows the corresponding CCIs. 
Table 3.4 Production Costs of Standard Bovine Meat in Morocco, France, USA and 
the Competitiveness Cost Index 
 
  The above table shows that standard quality bovine meat (bone-in) in Morocco 
costs about USD 5/kg in which operational costs occupy over 88%. The expenses related to 
fattening and feed constitute the most important components since they represent 
respectively over 58% and 22.5% respectively. Also, the performance of the bovine 
fattening shows significant differences with France and the US (only 60% and 50% 
Competitiveness Cost Index - 135% 156% 
Source: Ait El Mekki  et al. (2006) 
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respectively of the registered weight in those two countries). More important to know is the 
CCI comparison with the US and France. CCI measures the domestic producers’ costs in 
terms of a percentage of other nations’ producers’ costs. The CCI amounts to 135% in 
terms of France’s producer’s costs and 156% in terms of US producers’ costs. The 
purchase price of the animals and the feed prices are the main reasons behind the higher 
costs in Morocco. In addition, the low weight of the bovines at slaughter reduces the 
possibilities of reaching economies of scale. 
  Table 3.5 displays nominal and effective protection (NPC and EPC) figures that 
were calculated by Ait El Mekki et al. (2006) using a Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM).  NPC 
in beef was found to be 1.4 and EPC was 1.5. These results show clearly that there is a 
protection policy in place which imposes high tariffs on imports. This policy was found to 
benefit producers of an implicit subsidy of USD 0.8/kg. The PAM also showed no real 
comparative advantage in Morocco in the beef industry. 
Table 3.5 Nominal and Effective Protection in Bovine Meat in Morocco 
 
3.4 Overview of Demand 
  Due to the limited domestic production, absence of imports and high prices, 
Moroccan consumption of bovine meat remains quite low in terms of kilograms per capita: 
c  Source: Ait El Mekki  et al. (2006) 
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5 kg/capita, compared with 20 kg/capita in the EU and 9.5 kg/capita worldwide 
(FAOSTAT, Data Archives, 2003). As a matter of fact, consumption of bovine meat in 
Morocco (excluding burger patties and military consumption) is only covered by domestic 
production. The domestic production figures shown in the previous section will match the 
consumption figures. 
  The limited per capita consumption is in no means a detractor for potential 
exporters who see in the Moroccan market a big potential for growth. In fact, total bovine 
consumption in aggregate terms is quite high (150,000 metric tons in 2006). Moreover, the 
attractiveness of the market resides within the following important factors: 
• Price elasticity of demand: Mdafri and Brorsen (1993) are among the very few who 
made an accurate estimation for the price elasticity of demand (εd) for bovine meat. 
The study resulted in a Hicksian elasticity of -1.633 (εd = -1.633). This indicator of 
consumer’s sensitivity to price is relatively high and means that a 100 percent 
decrease in the price will lead to a 163 percent increase in quantity demanded. 
• Large population: the Moroccan population is over 30 million and is growing 
constantly (World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2007). If the 
market becomes open to international trade of bovine meat, opportunities will be 
very big for major exporting nations. 
• Changing composition of demand: The tourism industry has become a major source 
of economic growth, employment and hard currencies for the country. The 
Government has started a very ambitious and effective plan to boost tourist visitors 
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up to 10 million visitors by 2010. The plan has been working efficiently and in fact, 
the tourism population went from 3 million visitors in 2000 to over 7 million by the 
end of 2007 (Ministry of Tourism of Morocco, 2007). The growth plan is 
accompanied by gigantic foreign investments in tourism facilities (resorts, hotels, 
restaurants, leisure and attraction, etc.). Foreign investments in tourism related 
activities have exceeded USD 20 billion during 2006 alone. All this has led to 
changes in the nature of demand for bovine meat in Morocco. The MLA’s market 
intelligence in Morocco has suggested that hotels and restaurants are suffering 
because of poor and inconsistent quality of domestically supplied bovine meat. In 
addition, international hotel chains have strict food safety and traceability rules and 
they find it very disturbing to know that only 45% of the officially slaughtered red 
meat is controlled by sanitary authorities. Owners of these tourist facilities believe 
that the sanitary and food safety issues that the local red meat represents is a big 
disadvantage which should be taken care of rapidly. They argue that an incident (or 
recurring incidents) due to the poor food safety can have grave to disastrous 
impacts on tourism which is mainly controlled by tour operators. 
• Changing habits and consumer awareness: the Moroccan consumer is also 
becoming very concerned about the food safety issues that relate to red meat. 
Several cases of animal tuberculosis have led people to avoid beef consumption in 
some areas of Morocco. In addition, international media has played a determinant 
role in spreading the fear of animal disease outbreaks (BSE, FLD, avian flu, e-coli, 
etc.). These outbreaks have proven to be highly impacting the level of demand in 
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different parts of the world. Also, Moroccan consumption habits are changing as 
more and more of the household food purchases are made in hyper and super 
markets where more frozen and processed food is available. The tendency to eat 
away from home has also become very important and sizeable. 
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CHAPTER IV: THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
  This chapter will define the different economic theories and concepts behind this 
study: comparative advantage and gains from trade, welfare analysis and the notions of 
consumer and producer surplus. These theories were used within a partial equilibrium 
model in order to simulate different trade policies and evaluate their net impact on welfare. 
The derived conceptual model will be the basis for our empirical analysis. 
4.1 Comparative Advantage and Gains from Trade 
  Reed (2001) stated that even though gains from trade are not well known in the 
popular press, it is crucial for practicing economists to understand the resulting gains 
behind trade activity. Reed mentioned that the “gains from trade” concept does not 
involved “gains from exports” or “losses from imports,” but it rather illustrates the gains 
from importing and exporting. 
  Stoekel, Saunders and Monck (2007) from the Center of International Economics 
(CIE) mentioned that trade is a vital source of economic growth and that all parties get to 
gain from the consumption of more products, greater diversity and higher production 
efficiency. They added that openness to trade and its link to increased economic growth is 
one of the few things economists agree upon. 
  The economic case for free trade was brought forward by British economists 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo over two centuries ago and has been constantly reiterated 
ever since. The theory of comparative advantage stresses the proposition that relative 
productivity between nations is more important than absolute productivity. 
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  In fact, gains from trade are driven by both “absolute” and “comparative” 
advantage. The least-cost producer is the one who is said to have an absolute advantage. 
This producer will be able to sell his products worldwide. Although it might seem 
counterintuitive, but even if a country is not the least cost producer of anything they could 
make, they would still gain from trade. That is due to the more subtle and yet important 
concept of comparative advantage. 
  A producing country with comparative advantage is not necessarily the one with 
the lowest absolute cost of production but rather the one who is “relatively” more efficient 
at producing a certain good or in other terms, the one with the lower opportunity cost of 
production.  In terms of trade, opportunity cost is the cost of foregoing production of an 
alternative good. What matters in comparative advantage is the relative efficiency of 
production. This concept is more complex than absolute advantage since it lies with the 
producing country that is relatively more efficient than another. Comparative advantage 
always exists because it is a relative concept. 
  Reed (2001) stresses an important point which is that countries with closed 
economies are bound to consume only along their Production Possibility Frontiers (PPF). 
Their endowments cannot allow them to produce more than a certain combination of goods 
and in certain cases they cannot have access to several goods altogether. When assuming a 
fixed supply of inputs: land, labor, capital, etc. the production function of a country is such 
that if all those inputs are used for the production of a certain good, other products will 
have to be forgone. 
 34 
 
  There are several methods to measure gains from trade. One of them is to use a 
simplified two goods model in order to draw a PPF (with diminishing marginal rates of 
technical substitution) and account for the change in the social indifference curve. The 
indifference curve can be defined as the willingness of consumers to substitute one good 
for another. The economic objective in a society is to be on the indifference curve with the 
highest level of utility. 
  Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 depict the difference in welfare between two 
consumption points, one with trade and one without trade. For the sake of illustration, we 
assumed no tariffs or taxes, no transportation cost and the following:  
• Two countries: Morocco (small country) and the Rest of the World (ROW). 
• Two goods: Olives and Bovine Meat. Where Morocco has a comparative advantage 
in producing olives while the ROW’s comparative advantage lies in meat. 
  Morocco can use all its resources to either produce 100 units of olives or 20 units 
of cattle meat, or a combination of both along the PPF curve. Note that with the 
introduction of trade, the indifference curve is lifted upward from UU to U’U’ as the PP 
line which depicts the consumption possibilities is no longer relevant since Morocco can 
use the ROW supply and trade at the world relative price. This results in higher utility. 
Also, the world terms of trade are shown as P’P’ line which becomes the new budget 
constraint for the country instead of the PPF. If Morocco is a small country and can buy or 
sell any amount of goods without affecting the world price, and if the world relative price 
(or terms of trade) of olives are higher than the Moroccan relative price without trade, then 
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Morocco will export olives and import meat. Producers in Morocco will react to the new 
higher relative price of olives and increase their production (from Qo to Qot). The only way 
they can do that is by decreasing the production of meat (from Qm to Qmt). The gains from 
trade can be assessed by measuring the difference in welfare between the two consumption 
points (Cot – Co and Cmt – Cm). 
Figure 4.1 Morocco PPF and Indifference Curve with No Trade 
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Figure 4.2 Morocco PPF and Indifference Curve with Trade Introduction 
 
4.2 Welfare Analysis 
  The concept of PPF and the movement of the utility curve are good indicators of 
gains attained through free trade. However, they would not be a precise monetary measure 
of change in social welfare (how much producers lose and how much consumers gain). 
  Just et al. (1982) stated: “The definition of economic welfare for the consumer has 
been one of the most controversial subjects in economics. Unlike the producer’s case, 
where the observable measures of well-being such as profit can be clearly determined, no 
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criterion of the consumer utility is not observable.” The author also mentioned that 
monetary measures of change in consumer welfare can be reflected in his “willingness to 
pay” which is related to his utility function.  He added that “consumer surplus” that we will 
address in the following section, is the concept that is most often used in empirical studies 
in order to measure consumer welfare. 
4.3 Methodology: The Partial Equilibrium Model and the Notions of Consumer and 
Producer Surplus 
4.3.1 Partial Equilibrium 
  The use of a partial equilibrium model to simulate trade policies and analyze 
changes in welfare is a preferred method in agricultural economics. Reed (2001) argued 
that most international economists use the two-good model and emphasize the factor 
markets like labor and capital because their objective is to study the impact of trade on 
returns on those factors. However, agricultural economists usually focus on the output 
market and they look to analyze international trade matters and their effects on the pattern 
of trade. This type of analysis becomes easier when using a partial equilibrium model 
involving one good and several countries. The partial model involves supply and demand 
analysis that includes only the price of the good to be studied while holding all other prices 
constant. 
  This model can be the best choice in our case because it can show how changes in 
different variables (trade policies) affect the equilibrium for the one good in question 
(bovine meat). More importantly, it is the effect on equilibrium brought by those changes 
in trade policy variables that will let us measure the differences in net welfare in Morocco 
when trading with the rest of the world (ROW). 
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4.3.2 The Notions of Consumer and Producer Surplus 
  Reed (2001) gives a good description of consumer and producer surplus and 
stresses their importance in measuring welfare within comparative static situations such as 
the partial equilibrium model. He makes the following definitions: 
• Consumer surplus: A mean to measure the gains in welfare that consumers realize 
from buying goods at prices that are below what they are worth. Considering that a 
typical demand curve is downward sloping, it means that consumers are often 
willing to pay more for a product than the market price. This net gain that consumer 
accumulate is defined as a consumer surplus. Figure 4.3 uses a conceptual supply 
and demand domestic market for bovine meat (BM). The figure shows area abc 
which is below the demand curve and above the market price as the consumer 
surplus. That area is the sum of gains that consumers obtain but do not actually pay 
when considering the market price. 
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Figure 4.3 Notion of Consumer Surplus 
 
• Producer surplus: Similarly, a producer’s surplus will measure the gain in welfare 
that producers obtain from selling goods at a price level which is above their 
production cost. Since the typical supply curve (marginal cost curve) goes upward, 
the producer is often able to produce some units of his goods at levels below the 
market price. The net gain accumulated is the producer surplus. Figure 4.4 uses the 
previous example and depicts the surplus area bcd which is above the marginal cost 
curve and below the market price. 
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Figure 4.4 Notion of Producer Surplus 
 
4.4 Conceptual Model and Policy Simulation 
  This section will build a conceptual model and simulate trade policies given the 
theories and concepts discussed previously. 
  The model will use the Morocco bovine meat market (conceptually) to simulate 
four different trade policies and assign the corresponding consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, Government revenue when applicable and the net impact on social welfare. It is 
essential to make the following assumptions that would fit the case of our study before 
illustrating the model: 
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• There are two countries: Morocco and the Rest of the World (ROW). 
• Morocco is a small country compared to the ROW and does not affect international 
trade (either price or quantity). 
• There is perfect competition. 
• Prices of substitutes and complimentary goods are held constant. 
• Morocco does not have either an absolute or comparative advantage in the 
production of bovine meat. 
• Moroccan consumers are price sensitive and price elasticity of demand is greater 
than -1 (more negative than -1). 
• World prices of bovine meat are under the domestic price level. 
• There are no transport costs. 
• Morocco imposes a prohibitive tariff rate on bovine meat. 
4.4.1 Protectionist Policy 
  A protectionist policy simply means that the Government imposes trade barriers 
(most of the time in the form of tariffs) in order to protect the domestic production from 
import competition. A protectionist policy makes total supply and consumption limited to 
domestic production (Qs = Qd). Figure 4.5 illustrates partial equilibrium in an autarky 
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scenario. The domestic price Pd would equal to the world price Pw+ t, where t is the tariff 
imposed on that particular good. 
Figure 4.5 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy (Autarky) 
 
  The following figure 4.6 shows consumer and producer surplus in the domestic 
closed market. 
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Figure 4.6 Conceptual Consumer and Producer Surplus under a Protectionist Policy 
 
4.4.2 Free Trade Policy 
  An open trade policy would imply that the country’s borders are open to the ROW 
at the commercial level (as other restrictions may still prevail including sanitary 
regulations). With free trade, Morocco will be able to import and export freely all sorts of 
goods and services. Production will become specialized in those goods in which the 
country has a comparative advantage, while production of inefficient goods will be 
forgone. 
  At this point, it is important to introduce the concept of the “Effective Supply” 
curve. Effective supply, which is shown in the upcoming analysis as Se, in a small country, 
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is the sum of the upward-sloping domestic supply curve and the international supply curve. 
The international supply curve part is perfectly flat and elastic at the world price Pw since a 
small country cannot affect the world price. In this scenario, the new domestic price Pd’ 
becomes equal to Pw. 
Figure 4.7 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy 
 
  Figure 4.7 shows the supply and demand picture under free trade. Free trade policy 
results in lower domestic production Qp (compared to Qd) and an increase in consumption 
Qc relative to the closed economy equilibrium. The difference in quantity between Qp and 
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Qc are covered by imports M. More importantly, free trade leads to lower prices for small 
importing nations. The domestic price becomes equal to the world price. 
Figure 4.8 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Producer Surplus 
 
  Figure 4.8 demonstrates the loss incurred by producers due to free trade and the 
new prevailing price Pw. The producer surplus decreased from area bcd to efd which 
means a net loss of area bcfe. Only producers who can compete with world price Pw will 
receive the surplus. Producers who cannot compete will exit the market and imports will 
replace the difference in production. Domestic production has decreased by Qd – Qp, while 
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consumption has increased by Qc – Qd. Since Se is horizontal, the ROW will be able to 
supply any quantity that buyers are willing to pay for at Pw. 
Figure 4.9 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Consumer Surplus 
 
  On the other hand, Figure 4.9 shows the gain in consumer surplus due to free trade 
and which exceeds by far the loss to the producers. Consumer surplus increased from area 
abc to area aeg. This means that they gained the whole area bcge. Even if domestic 
production went down significantly (from Qd to Qp), buyers get to consume more (from 
Qd to Qc) as they are no longer bound to the PPF of their country. Their only boundary is 
the world supply and their willingness to pay at the Pw level. Since they save in monetary 
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terms, by paying Pw instead of Pd, and since they also increase their consumption, the 
combination results in a gain to consumer surplus exceeding the loss in producer surplus. 
Figure 4.10 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy - Net impact on Social 
Welfare 
 
  The gain in consumer surplus and the loss in producer surplus resulted in a net 
positive impact on social welfare. This net social welfare gain is shown in Figure 4.10 as 
area cfg which is the subtraction of producer surplus loss bcfe from the consumer surplus 
gain bcge. 
4.4.3 Import Quota Policy 
  The quota policy involves the introduction of limited free trade for a product 
(quantitative limit). Once the quantity under the quota is exhausted, over the quota imports 
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are taxed at the prevailing tariff rate. Usually, quotas are granted to other nations with 
whom a country has preferential trade status. Quotas in the red meat sector are very 
popular. One of the most famous issues related to quota granting is Australian sheep meat 
versus New Zealand sheep meat in the EU community. New Zealand has a preferential 
quota agreement with the EU compared to Australia due to its pre-existing strong 
agricultural ties with the United Kingdom and the existence of a quota with the UK prior 
even to the creation of the European common market. 
Figure 4.11 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy 
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  Figure 4.11 introduces the quota policy in the conceptual bovine meat market in 
Morocco. It is important to notice that at a price level under the world market price, the 
effective supply will correspond to the domestic supply curve which means that supply will 
come from domestic producers only. At price level Pw, the ROW is willing to supply any 
amount Morocco will allow. Since the country will only allow quantity M = Qmq – Qp 
under the import quota agreement with the ROW, the only way for the domestic market to 
be supplied with the product after the import has been exhausted is for domestic producers 
to increase production, which requires a higher price Pdq. This is the reason why Se comes 
back to an upward sloping shape for quantities above Qmq. Pdq is the new equilibrium 
domestic price that producers adjust to when the quota import is over, however, it is still 
lower than the original price of Pd under autarky. 
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Figure 4.12 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Producer 
Surplus 
 
  Gains from trade will differ from the free trade scenario as they will be limited to 
the quota part. In this study, all trade policy outcomes on social welfare will be compared 
with the initial autarky scenario. This means that our analysis of change in consumer and 
producer surplus in free trade, import quota and TRQ situation will be based on a 
comparison with the initial autarky situation (not with free trade scenario) and so on.  
  Figure 4.12 demonstrates the change in producer surplus when an import quota 
policy is introduced. The figure shows that compared to autarky, producers will loose in net 
terms area bcjh. This area is smaller then what they have lost under free trade because 
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producers will still be able to supply their product after the quota expires and charge a price 
of Pdq which is higher than Pw. Producers will supply Qp in addition to Qc – Qmq. 
Figure 4.13 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Consumer 
Surplus 
 
  On the other hand, consumer surplus will increase under an import quota policy 
compared to a protectionist policy but not as much as under free trade. Figure 4.13 
illustrates this increase in consumer surplus which is shown as area bcmh. The distance 
Qmq – Qp is the quantity imported under the quota agreement will allow buyers to 
consume more and pay less (Pdq instead of Pd).  
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Figure 4.14 Conceptual Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy - Net impact on 
Social Welfare 
 
  The gain brought to consumers through the import quota compared to a closed 
economy does exceed the loss that is incurred by producers. This means that social welfare 
will witness a net gain. The above figure shows the net welfare gain as cmj. Again, the net 
gain compared to autarky exists but it is much smaller compared to a free trade scenario 
(triangle cmj versus cgf). 
4.4.4 Tariff-Rate Quota Policy (TRQ) 
  A TRQ is a quantity limit on imports below which a reduced in-quota tariff is 
charged on imports. Most of the time the agreement will allow the quota quantity itself to 
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become duty free over time while the above-quota quantity will be taxed at a preferential or 
diminishing rate. Also, in order to account for seasonality of local production, the TRQ 
agreement could set a certain time period in the year during which imports will cease after 
the in-quota quantity is exhausted (example: 3 months after). Once imports resume under 
the TRQ terms, the above-quota imports will be taxed at the preferential rate. 
  The above example is the one that we use in this study since it is close to reality. 
Such a policy is also popular within protectionist countries and will allow the Government 
to maintain long term tariff revenues on imports and still insure commercialization of 
domestic production during high season periods. At the same time, the policy will give 
preferential access to countries to which the TRQ has been granted. 
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Figure 4.15 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy 
 
  Figure 4.15 demonstrates an equilibrium situation in the case of a TRQ in which 
the in-quota tariff is null, while the above-quota tariff is a reduced preferential tariff granted 
to the ROW. In the above example we will make the following assumptions: 
• Under the TRQ terms, the Government of Morocco will ban imports during 3 
months each year in order to allow local producers to sell during a sensitive period 
of the year.  
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• The above-quota preferential tariff (under the TRQ terms) is considerably lower 
than the prohibitive tariff under autarky. This makes the ROW still very 
competitive compared to Morocco producers when the above-quota is 
implemented. A preferential tariff will also generate revenue to the Government 
considering that a 254 percent prohibitive tariff rate under autarky does not generate 
any revenue.  
 These assumptions imply that the effective supply Se adjusts to the situation. Se 
slopes upward as long as domestic producers can supply under the Pw level. Then, the 
curve becomes flat when the in-quota rate (0 percent) is introduced. Effective supply will 
slope upward again between Pw and Pdtrq during the import ban period. As the competing 
production becomes exhausted and as imports are allowed back under the TRQ terms; 
exporters from the ROW will supply the difference at the price level of Pdtrq. Since there 
is no limit on the above-quota quantity, and since the ROW can sell without competition at 
Pdtrq level; Se which becomes world supply, will flatten again because Moroccan 
consumers cannot affect the world price. 
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Figure 4.16 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - 
Producer Surplus 
 
  Figure 4.16 determines the change in producer surplus due the TRQ agreement. 
Here, we do make another assumption which is that the gained area jli which is gained by 
producers due to the import ban period will be offset by the loss of area knf which 
belonged to producers under autarky. Therefore, the net loss in producer surplus compared 
to autarky is area bcnh. 
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Figure 4.17 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - 
Consumer Surplus 
 
  Consumer surplus clearly benefits from the TRQ agreement and gains area bcmh 
compared to autarky and as shown in Figure 4.17. In our case and given that the TRQ terms 
provide for preferential above-quota tariffs, making prices from the ROW still competitive; 
the gain made in consumer surplus should exceed the one made in the simple import quota 
policy (Figure 4.13).  
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Figure 4.18 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy – 
Government Revenue 
 
  The TRQ policy will also generate revenue to the Government during the above-
quota period. This gain in Government revenue is depicted in area lmop in Figure 4.18. The 
above-quota preferential tariff (Pdtrq – Pw) is behind this gain. This is an important gain 
simply because the Government does not currently have any revenue given the absence of 
imports caused by prohibitive tariff rates. Also, a simple import quota with 0 percent tariff 
would not generate any Government revenue. 
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Figure 4.19 Conceptual Equilibrium under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) Policy - Net 
impact on Social Welfare 
 
  The above figure shows the result of the net gain to social welfare from a TRQ 
policy. The net benefit in comparison with autarky is represented by area cmn + lmop. The 
area is the difference between the net gain in consumer surplus and the net loss in producer 
surplus in addition to the gain in Government revenue. 
  It is worth noting that a TRQ scenario (using the TRQ terms we assumed) leads to 
a much higher gain in social welfare compared to a simple quota policy. Comparing area 
cmn + lmop in Figure 4.19 and area cmj in Figure 4.14 illustrates this big difference in 
welfare gain. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
  Through the application of economic theory covered in this chapter, we modeled 
the different trade policies of interest (protectionism, free trade, import quota and tariff-rate 
quota) to demonstrate the impact each has on producers, consumers and social welfare. 
  Even though the conceptual model does not use numerical data to estimate gains 
and losses in monetary terms, the results of the model clearly shows the different effects 
each trade policy has and the positive impact of bovine meat trade openness. 
  Considering the conceptual model and the different assumptions we have made so 
far, we are able to derive the following hypotheses: 
• Free trade, import quota and TRQ policies, all have an advantage over 
protectionism (autarky) in terms of net gains in social welfare. 
• When we use protectionism as a basis for comparison, the other three policies all 
bring a net gain to consumers and a net loss to producers but at different degrees. 
• Free trade would bring the largest net benefit to social welfare followed by TRQ, 
then the import quota. 
• A TRQ is the only policy that could generate Government revenue. 
  Chapter Five will test the above hypotheses by building an empirical model and 
assigning monetary figures to each variable. 
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CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL MODEL, POLICY SIMULATION AND WELFARE 
ANALYSIS 
 This chapter puts life into the conceptual model and attempts to test the hypotheses 
and to find the necessary evidence for gains from trade and its net positive impact on social 
welfare. As in the conceptual model, we will simulate the four main trade policies of 
interest: protectionism, free trade, import quota and TRQ. We will also analyze the impacts 
on consumer surplus, producer surplus and net welfare, all in comparison with the starting 
point: autarky. It is essential to note that the empirical model’s importance lies within its 
monetary results.  
 Finally, we will summarize the simulation results into a Policy Analysis Matrix 
(PAM) and we will use a Sensitivity Analysis Matrix (SAM) to determine how sensitive 
these results are to variation in the price elasticity of demand and supply. 
5.1 Data 
  This research relied on the following sources of data: FAO, Ministry of 
Agriculture of Morocco and MLA. On the other hand, and for the sake of consistency, the 
empirical model part relied solely on FAO data except for price elasticity. 
  The required data is to be used to estimate the demand and supply functions in 
terms of price as a function of quantity while holding other variables constant. 
  Demand price function: 
P f(Q) = b + mQ 
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  Supply price function: 
P g(Q) = b’ + m’Q 
  In order to estimate demand and supply price functions, where P is the price of 
bovine meat in USD per metric ton and Q is the quantity of bovine meat in metric tons, we 
needed to have necessary data for Price (P), Quantity (Q) and elasticity (ε).  
  Elasticity ε will be used to estimate the demand and supply functions’ slopes (m 
and m’) since m = P / (Qε). This is found through the following derivation:            
ε = (∆Q/∆P) × (P/Q) 
∆Q/∆P = (Qε)/P 
∆P/∆Q = m = P/(Qε) 
• Price: We used a 10-year average producer price for both Morocco and the ROW. 
In the case of ROW, we used a weighed average based on quantities produced in 
each country. Table 5.1 displays the producer price of bovine meat in USD per MT 
in Morocco while Table 5.2 shows the producer prices of bovine meat in USD per 
MT for ROW. The ROW includes the following countries: Australia, US, France 
and Argentina. The prices used are nominal prices since inflation rate between 1997 
and 2006 was minimal. For instance, average inflation (1997-2006) was less than 
2% (World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2007).  
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Table 5.1 Morocco Producer Nominal Price for Bovine Meat in USD per MT 
(1997-2006) 
Year   USD per MT 
       1997             5 353   
       1998             5 602   
       1999             5 487   
       2000             4 442   
       2001             4 273   
       2002             4 891   
       2003             5 995   
       2004             6 770   
       2005             6 069   
       2006             5 364   
 10 yr av            5 425   
Source: FAOSTAT – PriceSTAT 
  
Table 5.2 ROW Producer Nominal Price for Bovine Meat in USD per MT 
(1997-2006) 
Year USD per MT 
1997            2 504   
1998            2 446   
1999            2 451   
2000            2 582   
2001            2 606   
2002            2 461   
2003            2 928   
2004            3 182   
2005            3 411   
2006            2 651   
10 year avg            2 722   
Source: FAOSTAT – PriceSTAT 
  
  Appendix F and E include data on ROW producer nominal price and production 
respectively. These were used to calculate a weighted average producer price for the ROW.  
o Domestic price Pd = USD 5425 per MT and  
o ROW price Pw = USD 2722 per MT.  
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• Quantity: Since domestic production in Morocco covers nearly 100% of domestic 
demand, we have used a 10-year average of the production quantity of bovine meat.  
Table 5.3 Production of Bovine Meat in Morocco (1997-2006) 
Year Quantity in MT 
1997              125 000   
1998              120 000   
1999              135 000   
2000              140 000   
2001              145 000  
2002              170 000   
2003              150 000   
2004              140 000   
2005              150 400   
2006              150 000   
10 year avg              142 540   
Source: FAOSTAT – ProdSTAT 
 
In the current circumstances, quantity produced domestically equals quantity 
consumed. Qd = Qc = 142,540 MT. 
• Elasticity: 
o Price elasticity of demand εd = -1.633 
The elasticity of demand was sourced from a study by Mdafri and Brorsen 
(1993) on demand for red meat, poultry and fish in Morocco. 
o Price elasticity of supply εs = 0.80 
The elasticity of supply was sourced from ANPVR (National Association of 
Red Meat Producers) in a study by Chafai (2004). 
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  Using the above data, we can estimate both the demand function and supply 
function within a partial equilibrium model while other variables are held constant: 
• Demand function: P f(Q) 
P = b + mQ, where P = 5425, Q  = 142,540 and εd = -1.633 
The slope m = P / Qεd = -0.023 
By replacing m, P and Q, we find: b = 8747.10 
The bovine meat demand function (Price as a function of Quantity) is: 
P = 8747.10 – 0.023 Q 
• Supply function: P g(Q) 
P = b’ + m’Q, where P = 5425, Q  = 142,540 and εs = 0.8 
The slope m’ = P / Qεs = 0.047 
By replacing m’, P and Q, we find b’ = - 1356.25 
The bovine meat supply function (Price as a function of Quantity) is: 
P = -1356.25 + 0.047 Q 
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5.2 Empirical Model Assumptions 
 We will keep similar, but more refined assumptions compared to the conceptual 
model: 
• The two countries consist of: Morocco (small nation with no effect on international 
price) and the ROW. The ROW will include for the sake of our research: Australia, 
United States, Argentina and France. The choice of these countries to be included in 
the ROW is based on either existing trade agreements (US and France) or fully 
approved sanitary status by Moroccan authorities (Australia and Argentina). 
• There is perfect competition. 
• Prices of substitutes and complimentary goods are held constant. 
• Morocco does not have either an absolute or comparative advantage in the 
production of bovine meat. 
• Moroccan consumers of bovine meat are price sensitive. Price elasticity of demand 
(εd) is -1.633 (Mdafri and Brorsen 1993). 
• Price elasticity of supply (εs) is 0.8. This figure is commonly used for bovine meat 
supply (Chafai, ANPVR, 2004). 
• There are no transport costs. 
• In order to be consistent with our statistical database, bovine meat excludes edible 
offal and fats. 
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5.3 Trade Policy Simulation and Welfare Analysis 
  We have used the researched data and the derived supply and demand functions to 
produce computer generated supply and demand curves and simulate a partial equilibrium 
model across the four trade policies. 
5.3.1 Protectionist Policy 
  Figure 5.1 in the next page shows the actual market demand and supply curves and 
equilibrium given the current state of autarky and a prohibitive tariff rate. 
Figure 5.1 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy 
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  The equilibrium model in a protectionist scenario gives us price Pd = Pw + t and 
Qc = Qp at the levels we have found in the previous section. At equilibrium, Pd = USD 
5425 per MT, and Qc = Qp =142,540 MT. Under autarky, all domestic consumption is 
covered by domestic production. We should note that the current tariff of 254 percent was 
set decades ago and does not reflect the actual difference between Pd and Pw. 
  Figure 5.2 shows the size of the consumer surplus (CS). 
Figure 5.2 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy – Consumer Surplus 
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  Consumer surplus (CS) would be equal to area abc.  Triangle area abc would equal 
to line ac times line bc, divided by 2. 
  This gives us: 
CS = USD 236,766,067.00 
  The next figure 5.3 shows the size of the producer surplus (PS). 
Figure 5.3 Empirical Equilibrium under a Protectionist Policy – Producer Surplus 
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  Producer surplus (PS) would be equal to area cbmd.  We will calculate the area of 
triangle cbn and subtract triangle dmn from the total (28,508 MT x 1356.25) / 2 = USD 
19,331,987.50. 
  This gives us: PS = ( ( (5425 + 1356.25) x 142,540 ) / 2 ) - USD 19,331,987.50 
PS = USD 463,967,700.00 
  In the protectionism scenario, producers have about two times more surplus than 
consumers.  
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5.3.2 Free Trade Policy 
Figure 5.4 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy 
 
  The above figure shows the new equilibrium when free trade is introduced with the 
ROW. The price falls significantly (a drop of 50 percent). Pw becomes the prevailing price 
and consumption increases by 262,000 MT – 142,540 MT (119,460 metric tons) which is a 
phenomenal increase of 84 percent. This is also equivalent to 4 kg per capita increase in 
nutritional intake making total consumption close to 9 kg per capita which becomes in line 
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with the world average. Imports M are now covering the majority of the domestic needs 
(175,000 MT or 67% of total demand). 
Figure 5.5 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Consumer Surplus 
 
  Consumer surplus (CS) in a free trade scenario as shown in Figure 5.5 is equal to 
area aef. Which can be quantified by multiplying fe by af and dividing by 2. This gives us: 
CS = USD 789,288,100.00 
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  CS more than tripled compared to the autarky scenario (USD 236,766,067.00). 
The net gain in CS is: 
CS gain = USD 552,522,033.00 
  Figure 5.6 shows the change in producer surplus (PS). 
Figure 5.6 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Producer Surplus 
 
  Producers in an open market will lose significantly. Their new surplus is equal to 
area fgmd which is triangle fgn minus triangle dmn (dmn being USD 19,331,987.50). 
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PS = USD 177,403,875 – USD 19,331,987.50 
PS = USD 158,071,887.50 
Their net loss is:    PS loss = USD – 305,895,813.00 
Figure 5.7 Empirical Equilibrium under a Free Trade Policy – Net Social Welfare 
 
  The net impact of the consumer surplus gain and producer surplus loss in a free 
trade policy is a net social welfare gain (area beg). This is shown in Figure 5.7. 
   0
28508 
50000 
100 000 
142 540 
200 000 
250 000 
300 000 
350 000 
Q in MT 
P in USD / MT 
Sd 
Dd 
Pd = Pw + t 
             5425  
1000 
2000 
3000 
4000 
5000 
6000 
7000 
8000 
8747.10 
375 308 
-1356.25 
Pw = 2722  
Q
p 87 000 
Q
c 262 000 
e Se 
a 
b 
c 
f 
+
Net Social Welfare gain = beg 
d 
g 
 75 
 
SW gain = USD 552,522,033.00 - USD 305,895,813.00 
SW gain = USD 246,626,220.00 
  
5.3.3 Import Quota Policy 
Figure 5.8 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy 
 
  Figure 5.8 shows the equilibrium when we assume that a bovine meat quota of 
53,000 metric tons is granted to the ROW. The quota will come in duty free, which means 
that when the quota is in effect, the domestic price will be equal to the world price. 
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Producers being able to compete below Pw will be able to sell 87,000 metric tons. After the 
quota is exhausted, another 45,000 metric tons will be supplied by those local producers. 
The continuous price adjustment makes the equilibrium Pdq equal to USD 4492.10. 
Figure 5.9 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy –  
Consumer Surplus 
 
  Figure 5.9 measures the consumer surplus in an import quota scenario. Consumer 
surplus would be equal to area ail (al times li, divided by 2) which is: 
CS = USD 393,587,500.00 
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Compared to autarky, Consumers gain area cbil. 
CS gain = USD 156,821,433.00 
Figure 5.10 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy – 
Producer Surplus 
 
  Figure 5.10 estimates the change in producer surplus when moving from autarky to 
import quotas of 53,000 metric tons granted to the ROW. 
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  Producer surplus would be equal to area lkgmd + jih. Area jih represents the gain 
attained after the quota expires. However this later area will be canceled by the loss of area 
kjg when the quota is in place. Both areas jih and kjg have the same dimension (price time 
quantity). Overall, producers’ net loss is area cbjl. 
PS = USD 153,998,700.00 + USD 177,403,875.00 – USD 19,331,987.50 
PS = 312,070,587.50 
  The net loss to PS compared to autarky is:  
PS loss = USD – 151,897,113.50 
  Generally, an import quota policy is implemented by the Government through the 
issuance of import licenses to private operators. These licenses may generate revenue to the 
Government that can be accounted for as an increase in social welfare. Since these 
revenues cannot be estimated accurately in our research and are usually not significant, we 
will assume that licenses are delivered at no cost. 
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Figure 5.11 Empirical Equilibrium under an Import Quota Policy – Net Social 
Welfare 
 
  Figure 5.11 estimates the net gain in social welfare compared to autarky when 
import quotas are granted to the ROW. Area bij represents this net gain. 
  The net gain in social welfare compared to autarky is: 
SW gain = USD 4,924,320.50 
  This is a very small gain compared to the free trade situation. 
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5.3.4 Tariff-Rate Quota Policy (TRQ) 
Figure 5.12 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy 
 
  Figure 5.12 estimates equilibrium under a TRQ policy. Local producers supply the 
first 87,000 metric tons competitively, after which the TRQ takes place. The TRQ 
agreement provides for an in-quota of 53,000 metric tons at a zero percent tariff. When the 
quota is exhausted, imports are banned for a short period of time to allow for seasonality 
and local producers start supplying the market again with 12,000 metric tons (152,000 MT 
– 140,000 MT). Afterwards, the above-quota imported quantity (99,000 metric tons) is 
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supplied at a very preferential tariff of 20 percent, making final equilibrium price Pdtrq = 
USD 3250.10 per metric ton. Overall, the total quantity of imports in such a scenario can 
reach 140,000 metric tons (53,000 MT in-quota and 87,000 MT above-quota) covering 58 
percent of total consumption. 
  We assume that import quota licenses do not generate revenue to the Government. 
However, the difference between Pw and Pdtrq (in-quota tariff) will generate cash revenue 
to the Government. 
Figure 5.13 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Consumer Surplus 
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  Figure 5.13 estimates consumer surplus basis a TRQ policy. CS would grow 
compared to autarky and will cover area aef by gaining area cbef. This will translate into 
the following monetary figures: 
CS = USD 656,891,500.00 
CS gain = USD 420,125,433.00 
Figure 5.14 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Producer Surplus 
 
  Figure 5.14 shows a change in producer surplus with a TRQ policy and in 
comparison with a state of autarky. 
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  The results give the following estimates: 
  PS equals area fkgmd and jih. Area jih cancels out with area klg. Net PS would be 
equal to fkgmd.  PS = USD 45,944,700.00 + USD 177,403,875.00 – USD 19,331,987.50 
PS = USD 204,016,587.50 
PS loss = USD – 259,951,112.5 
Figure 5.15 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Government Revenue 
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  A 20 percent preferential above-quota tariff under the described TRQ policy will 
lead to a gain in Government revenue of USD 528.10 per metric ton multiplied by 87,000 
metric tons (area iepo in Figure 5.15). This revenue was inexistent under the protectionism 
policy. 
GR = GR gain = USD 45,944,700.00 
 
Figure 5.16 Empirical Equilibrium under a TRQ Policy – Net Social Welfare 
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  Figure 5.16 finally calculates the net impact on social welfare given a TRQ policy 
(areas bel + iepo). Since CS gain is greater than PS loss, the net result on welfare is 
positive. In addition, the Government revenue made through the over-the-quota tariff is a 
significant contributor to the net gain in social welfare under a TRQ policy.  
SW gain = USD 160,174,320.50 
5.4 Model Closure: Policy Analysis Matrix – Simulation Results 
Table 5.4 Policy Analysis Matrix – Simulation Results 
 Policy 1 * Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
 Protectionism Free Trade Import Quota TRQ 
Variables         
% Change in Domestic Consumption na 84% 30% 68% 
Change in Consumption in Kg/Capita na 9.20 6.50 8.40 
% Change in Domestic Production na -39% -7% -31% 
% Change in Terms of Trade na -50% -17% -40% 
Size of Imports in MT na           175 000.00             53 000.00    140 000.00  
Imports as a % of Consumption na 67% 28% 58% 
Consumer Surplus $236 766 067.00 $789 288 100.00 $393 587 500.00 $656 891 500.00 
Producer Surplus $463 967 700.00 $158 071 887.00 $312 070 587.50 $204 016 587.50 
Government Revenue na na na $45 944 700.00 
Change in Consumer Surplus  na  $552 522 033.00 $156 821 433.00 $420 125 433.00 
Change in Producer Surplus  na  -$305 895 813.00 -$151 897 112.50 -$259 951 112.50 
Change in Government Revenue na na na $45 944 700.00 
Change in Net Social Welfare *  na  246 626 220.00 4 924 320.50 206 119 020.50 
* P1 is the basis of comparison     
 
  Table 5.4 combines the final results of our empirical model and trade policy 
simulation. Policy 2 (Free trade) results in the highest gain in social welfare (one quarter of 
a billion US dollars), while a TRQ comes in closely in a second place followed by far by 
the quota policy. 
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  Free trade policy also results in the highest increase in consumption and nutritional 
intake (84%), followed by TRQ (68%), and import quota policy (30%). 
  Domestic production decrease is also the highest in a free trade scenario (-39%), 
then in a TRQ scenario (-31%), while an import quota leads to a mere decrease in 
production (-7%). 
  Terms of trade are also highly affected when there is an open market (-50%). A 
TRQ would also decrease terms of trade significantly (-40%). On the other hand, the 
import quota policy leads to a weak price fall (-17%). 
  It is also worth putting these welfare economics results in terms of agricultural 
GDP. Since agricultural GDP fluctuates strongly depending on weather conditions, we 
used two reference years:  
• Year 2000 (drought year): Agricultural GDP was equal to USD 5.5 billion. 
• Year 2006 (bumper year): Agricultural GDP was equal to USD 10.2 billion. 
Table 5.5 Net Social Welfare Gains in Terms of Agricultural GDP 
 Policy 1 * Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
 Protectionism Free Trade Import Quota TRQ 
Change in Net Social Welfare  na  $246 626 220.00  $4 924 320.50  $206 119 020.50 
In terms of year 2006 Agricultural GDP  na  2.5% 0.05% 2.1% 
In terms of year 2000 Agricultural GDP  na  4.5% 0.1% 3.7% 
  
  Net social welfare gains under free trade and TRQ policies have very close 
percentage equivalence of agricultural GDP. 
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5.5 Sensitivity Analysis Matrix 
  Table 5.6 shows the impact of different levels of price elasticity of demand and 
supply. The results are a good indicator of the importance of price elasticity factor within 
our welfare analysis case. We used P2 (Free Trade) as a basis of our analysis, since the 
direction of sensitivity to a varying price elasticity should be very similar across different 
policies.  
Table 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis Matrix – The Case of Free Trade Policy 
   Price Elasticity of Demand   
 -1.00 -1.25 -1.63 -2.00 
 
 
0.25 $119 980 072.68 $143 976 087.22 $180 450 029.31 $215 964 130.82 
0.50 $143 976 087.22 $167 972 101.75 $204 446 043.85 $239 960 145.36 
0.80 $172 771 304.66 $196 767 319.19 $246 626 220.00 $268 755 362.80 
1.00 $191 968 116.29 $215 964 130.82 $253 205 945.38 $287 952 174.43 
 
  The above matrix shows that a larger price elasticity of demand and supply (in 
absolute value) increases the net gain in social welfare. In other terms, the higher the 
responsiveness consumers and producers have to price change, the higher is the gain in 
social welfare brought by more trade openness. 
Price Elastoicty of Supply 
 88 
 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
  This study was conducted with the purpose of evaluating economic evidence that 
bovine meat import liberalization would result in net benefits to society, contrary to the 
general perception which implies that opening up borders for imports will dramatically 
impact society due to losses incurred by producers. 
  The empirical model enabled us to see a broader picture, one that includes 
consumers as a main component of society. In fact, all players in a society are consumers, 
while not all consumers are producers. The fact that bovine producers in Morocco detain on 
average a small number of heads (less than 2) leads us to conclude that Moroccan bovine 
producers can be “net” consumers of bovine meat. 
  By looking at the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), it is in the nation’s interest to 
consider freer trade for bovine meat. The PAM can be valuable evidence in the hands of 
trade negotiators representing bovine meat exporting nations. The matrix will also allow 
identifying the best route to take while negotiating an agricultural trade package that 
includes bovine meat. Potential trade negotiators could use the PAM to evaluate and 
simulate changes in terms of trade, consumption and imports by altering the agreement 
conditions of an import quota or a TRQ. 
  It is clear that the best negotiation option for an exporting country is Policy 4 (P4) 
which consists of a TRQ agreement that will allow for a null in-quota tariff in addition to 
an above-quota preferential tariff rate of 20% and down from the actual 254% rate. The 
main reasons for considering P4 are: 
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• Including seasonality factors into the agreement will allow local competitive 
producers to offer their meat during key production periods and partly appease the 
Moroccan side that opposes liberalization.  
• A full free trade agreement will be harder to negotiate and conceive especially in 
the medium term.  
• P3 (import quota) will not be attractive for the Moroccan Government simply 
because it does not show any significant improvement in social welfare.  
• P4 will also be the most attractive to the Moroccan Government since it is the only 
trade policy that would generate State revenue.  
• As far as export opportunities are concerned, a TRQ in our case is much closer to 
P2 (free trade) in terms of potential exportable quantities (140,000 MT versus 
175,000 MT).  
• The net gain is social welfare is important and not much different than that of P2 
(USD 246 million versus USD 206) and could be quantified as about 4 percent of 
agricultural GDP. 
  Although this research was based on a partial equilibrium model where we have to 
keep external variables constant, we have made it clear throughout our study that certain 
variables are of major concern and importance when it comes to affecting demand. Our 
research led to the identification and understanding of two main variables that will certainly 
become of major importance in affecting demand in the medium to longer run. These 
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variables deserve further analysis and we do recommend their inclusion within future 
research: 
• Tourism factor: As we have mentioned, tourism has become a major component of 
Moroccan demand for bovine meat. In order to assess its size and importance 
within total demand, an independent estimation of its price elasticity and 
consumption in Kg per visitor can be very useful. Building a demand curve that will 
include tourism will have much more significance and impact on the shape of the 
curve especially when the country will start exceeding the 10 million visitors per 
year (one third of the Moroccan permanently resident population). It is also worth 
noting that the a sustained growth in tourism will be gradually shift the demand 
curve to the right, resulting into a larger and larger consumer surplus and increasing 
the gain in net social welfare. The Sensitivity Analysis Matrix could be used to 
account for the change brought by the growth in tourism to the nature of demand. 
This is because the price elasticity of tourism demand will be different than the 
price elasticity of Moroccan residents demand. 
• Food safety, consumer awareness and eating quality: The increase in consumer 
awareness regarding food safety, bio-security and animal disease has never been of 
such an importance. It is just a matter of time when Morocco will need to seriously 
upgrade its poor sanitary control system, especially if the country wants to keep up 
with the tourism growth strategy. On the other hand, eating quality which has also 
become part of the international red meat grading systems could not be possibly 
improved without a major change in the breeding selection of cattle, pasture 
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management and fattening processes.  Further research on the share of these 
variables in driving demand will be useful as far as estimating a more representative 
demand curve. The benefits that consumers perceive from these variables could be 
quantified and included in the welfare analysis. 
  Finally, it is necessary for exporting nations who see interest in the bovine meat 
market in Morocco to understand that trade openness will also have social implications on 
domestic producers apart from economic consequences. The Government of Morocco 
would obviously prefer to avoid such social implications. Negotiating a trade package that 
opens a door for exports while preserving a certain balance in societal parameters is a safer 
option to consider and the most likely to result in an agreement. In addition to the 
measurable advantages brought by the TRQ terms as determined in this thesis, the policy 
would also allow for long-term gains in domestic productivity and the implementation of 
higher sanitary and quality standards as competitive producers would seek to adjust to the 
new market rules. 
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APPENDIX A: MOROCCO TARIFF SCHEDULE – CHAPTER 2, EDIBLE 
ANIMAL MEATS 
 
 
Source: Morocco Customs Administration, 2006 
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APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL PRODUCTION OF LIVESTOCK IN MOROCCO 
(NUMBER OF HEADS) 
Year Stocks of Cattle Stocks of Sheep Stocks of Goats 
1961         2 801 000           13 041 700            7 000 000   
1962         2 564 000           10 268 100            6 000 000   
1963         2 686 000            9 123 500            6 500 000   
1964         2 871 000           10 362 900            6 400 000   
1965         3 044 000           11 990 300            6 540 000   
1966         3 277 000           12 569 700            6 980 000   
1967         3 377 000           13 408 000            7 630 000   
1968         3 315 000           14 750 000            8 176 000   
1969         3 580 000           16 000 000            8 750 000   
1970         3 600 000           17 000 000            8 500 000   
1971         3 670 000           18 260 000            8 150 000   
1972         3 500 000           16 500 000            8 000 000   
1973         3 600 000           16 000 000             7 500 000   
1974         3 400 000           16 000 000            7 000 000   
1975         3 620 000           14 800 000            6 800 000   
1976         3 620 000           14 270 000            5 750 000   
1977         3 400 000           14 300 000            5 600 000   
1978         3 600 000           14 300 000            5 972 000   
1979         3 460 900           13 500 000            5 702 440   
1980         3 376 200           16 509 808             6 153 500   
1981         3 247 870           15 675 000            5 462 260   
1982         2 536 530           10 155 000            4 092 000   
1983         2 430 900           12 611 000            4 911 000   
1984         2 362 880           11 493 179            4 222 000   
1985         2 501 000           12 862 000            4 662 000   
1986         2 851 339           14 544 940            5 276 260   
1987         3 177 540           16 135 660            5 806 900   
1988         3 136 926           12 733 345            5 030 495   
1989         3 324 240           13 761 368            5 281 310   
1990         3 346 258           13 514 426            5 335 093   
1991         3 182 920           13 307 557            4 560 995   
1992         3 004 830           13 153 700            4 673 676   
1993         2 348 258           11 868 070            3 867 420   
1994         2 343 200           13 308 900            3 973 000   
1995         2 370 800           13 388 600            4 014 400   
1996         2 408 400           14 536 100            4 594 700   
1997         2 547 200           15 286 700            4 789 900   
1998         2 568 600           14 783 900            4 959 200   
1999         2 565 500           16 576 400            4 704 400   
2000         2 674 600           17 299 700            4 930 700   
2001         2 647 100           17 172 300            5 133 300   
2002         2 669 600           16 335 500            5 090 400   
2003         2 688 600           16 743 000            5 208 300   
2004         2 728 800           17 026 300            5 358 600   
2005         2 721 700           16 872 000             5 331 600   
2006         2 721 700           16 872 000            5 331 600   
Source: FAOSTAT, 
ResourceSTAT   
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APPENDIX C: ALL RED MEATS PRODUCTION HISTORY IN MOROCCO 
(In 1000's of Metric Tons)   
Year Bovine meat Ovine meat Goat meat Camel meat Horse meat Pig meat All Red Meats 
1961        67 080   45200 20000 3400 1190 2200           139 070   
1962        67 730   36900 17900 3300 1630 1850           129 310   
1963        67 800   30800 18000 3300 1300 1035           122 235   
1964        63 660   33160 18000 3400 1440 1000           120 660   
1965        72 300   38660 19000 3400 1640 995           135 995   
1966        79 100   40000 20000 2700 1400 700           143 900   
1967        81 100   42700 22000 2700 1400 800          150 700   
1968        87 000   47000 24000 3400 1800 1200           164 400   
1969        92 000   45000 24000 3400 1900 1800           168 100   
1970        92 000   46300 24500 3700 2970 1650           171 120   
1971        90 000   49000 25000 3902 4100 2185           174 187   
1972        93 000   50000 26000 4000 4210 2374           179 584   
1973        92 000   50000 26000 3609 4863 1884           178 356   
1974        90 000   50000 25000 4468 3794 1103           174 365   
1975        81 400   43300 23000 3900 3100 600           155 300   
1976        79 400   40600 12970 3200 3500 540           140 210   
1977        90 000   47000 14150 2157 4000 750           158 057   
1978        95 000   50000 18000 2266 2640 638           168 544   
1979       100 000   50000 19000 1780 3600 576           174 956   
1980       107 000   52000 19000 1800 4400 580           184 780   
1981       131 000   65000 15000 1700 6000 600           219 300   
1982       150 000   46000 13000 3780 4300 650           217 730   
1983       124 000   47400 11290 2733 3360 660           189 443   
1984       114 900   49970 11060 2197 2100 660           180 887   
1985        85 000   54440 12100 1657 1700 410           155 307   
1986       103 000   51030 16000 1700 1800 455           173 985   
1987       118 000   64200 20000 2000 2000 600           206 800   
1988       122 100   90995 20000 1750 2400 600           237 845   
1989       150 045   103120 23400 1800 2400 640           281 405   
1990       144 890   100335 21500 2200 2500 700           272 125   
1991       149 000   99214 20800 2000 2500 700           274 214   
1992       145 000   108805 19500 2200 2400 719           278 624   
1993       150 000   102459 20000 2150 2300 710           277 619   
1994       125 000   104570 20000 2250 2200 730           254 750   
1995       122 100   112000 20000 2050 2100 730           258 980   
1996       103 000   90000 22000 2000 2100 730           219 830   
1997       125 000   120000 22000 2000 2000 750           271 750   
1998       120 000   115000 22000 2120 2000 560           261 680   
1999       135 000   126000 20000 2000 2000 600           285 600   
2000       140 000   125000 22000 2000 2000 600           291 600   
2001       145 000   125000 20500 2000 2000 600           295 100   
2002       170 000   110000 15000 2000 1900 600           299 500   
2003       150 000   105000 13000 2000 1900 600           272 500   
2004       140 000   105000 18000 2000 1900 581           267 481   
2005       150 400   108000 16000 2000 1900 568           278 868   
2006       150 000   112000 17000 2000 1900 568           283 468   
Source: FAOSTAT, 
ProdSTAT       
* Based on Dressed Carcass Weight: Excluding Offals and Slaughter Fats.     
Bovine includes Veal and Ovine includes Lamb.     
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APPENDIX D: HISTORICAL CATTLE MEAT YILED IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES: KG/HEAD(1) 
Year Morocco Australia France USA 
1961 114 150 182 214 
1962 109 157 178 213 
1963 120 156 180 223 
1964 123 155 186 224 
1965 124 149 189 218 
1966 126 149 180 228 
1967 119 155 182 235 
1968 119 159 186 238 
1969 117 166 189 243 
1970 116 172 193 255 
1971 112 178 198 256 
1972 111 181 206 263 
1973 105 176 217 269 
1974 110 182 219 264 
1975 105 183 201 240 
1976 116 173 206 249 
1977 136 165 201 246 
1978 146 168 221 254 
1979 149 177 228 268 
1980 136 176 234 271 
1981 147 173 238 271 
1982 157 181 233 265 
1983 177 169 237 267 
1984 170 183 241 264 
1985 170 186 241 274 
1986 167 187 245 275 
1987 167 190 249 280 
1988 167 195 243 287 
1989 186 205 255 292 
1990 162 211 286 296 
1991 163 210 288 306 
1992 134 205 271 307 
1993 131 215 273 304 
1994 152 220 273 313 
1995 154 218 280 310 
1996 160 219 282 304 
1997 176 215 278 307 
1998 178 209 278 317 
1999 192 221 281 322 
2000 175 229 278 327 
2001 180 236 280 327 
2002 178 236 283 336 
2003 185 224 286 328 
2004 194 231 292 340 
2005 194 244 287 345 
2006 194 247 288 351 
Source: FAOSTAT, ResourceSTAT    
(1): Based on Full Carcass Weight.    
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APPENDIX E: BOVINE MEAT PRODUCTION IN ROW IN METRIC TONS 
(1991-2006) 
Year France USA Argentina Australia Total Production 
1991 2 026 068 10 534 000 2 918 000 1 759 569 17 237 637 
1992 1 876 800 10 612 000 2 784 000 1 790 870 17 063 670 
1993 1 703 800 10 584 000 2 808 000 1 825 813 16 921 613 
1994 1 626 800 11 194 000 2 783 000 1 824 805 17 428 605 
1995 1 683 300 11 585 000 2 688 000 1 803 417 17 759 717 
1996 1 737 000 11 749 000 2 694 000 1 744 696 17 924 696 
1997 1 720 000 11 714 000 2 712 000 1 810 300 17 956 300 
1998 1 632 000 11 803 000 2 469 169 1 955 253 17 859 422 
1999 1 609 000 12 123 000 2 719 784 2 010 530 18 462 314 
2000 1 527 600 12 298 000 2 718 000 1 987 902 18 531 502 
2001 1 566 000 11 982 000 2 461 000 2 119 000 18 128 000 
2002 1 640 000 12 427 000 2 493 000 2 028 000 18 588 000 
2003 1 632 000 12 039 000 2 658 000 2 073 000 18 402 000 
2004 1 565 492 11 180 700 3 024 000 2 033 000 17 803 192 
2005 1 516 912 11 242 900 2 980 118 2 161 958 17 901 888 
2006* 1 473 097 11 910 000 2 980 118 2 077 072 18 440 287 
10 last yr avg 1 588 210 11 871 960 2 721 519 2 025 602 18 207 291 
* Estimate      
Source: FAOSTAT, ProdSTAT     
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APPENDIX F: BOVINE MEAT PRODUCER NOMINAL PRICE IN ROW IN 
USD/MT (1991-2006) 
Year France USA Argentina Australia 
Weighted 
Average Price 
1991     3 773.41      3 082.00      1 572.02      1 712.94    2 767.91 
1992     3 983.89      3 023.00      1 902.81      1 559.14    2 792.29 
1993     3 784.06      3 078.00       1 646.74      1 400.15    2 730.55 
1994     3 928.28      2 828.00      1 605.59      1 719.61    2 619.46 
1995     4 004.22      2 620.00      1 623.41      1 638.21    2 500.67 
1996     3 745.93      2 513.50      1 728.58      1 432.08    2 409.70 
1997     3 444.25      2 684.60      1 936.97      1 289.17    2 503.77 
1998     3 608.60      2 530.80      2 248.12      1 217.47    2 446.42 
1999     3 383.96      2 684.60      1 689.85      1 323.27    2 450.76 
2000     2 933.81      2 900.00      1 847.92      1 343.90    2 581.55 
2001     2 551.18      3 019.20      1 630.82      1 445.61    2 606.35 
2002     2 716.01      2 823.10      1 055.74      1 760.88    2 460.72 
2003     3 399.64       3 392.30     1 395.22      1 826.95    2 928.15 
2004     4 003.19      3 632.70      1 706.39      2 262.03    3 181.56 
2005     4 162.82      3 811.50      2 094.18      2 619.98    3 411.49 
2006*     3 354.49      2 931.46      1 791.31      1 778.33    2 651.11 
Last 10 yr avg     3 355.80      3 041.03      1 739.65      1 686.76    2 722.19 
* Estimate      
Source: FAOSTAT, PriceSTAT     
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APPENDIX G: BOVINE MEAT PRODUCER NOMINAL PRICE IN MOROCCO 
IN USD/MT (1991-2006) 
 
Year USD/MT 
1 991 4 250 
1 992 4 568 
1 993 4 377 
1 994 5 640 
1 995 5 855 
1 996 6 540 
1 997 5 353 
1 998 5 602 
1 999 5 487 
2 000 4 442 
2 001 4 273 
2 002 4 891 
2 003 5 995 
2 004 6 770 
2 005 6 069 
2 006 5 364 
Last 10 years average 5 425 
 
  Source: FAOSTAT, PriceSTAT 
